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Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Germany 




This article outlines the corruption challenges that Germany faces before explaining what 
German elites have done to try to counteract them. It utilises a neo-institutionalist 
framework to argue that whilst Germany’s anti-corruption infrastructure remains strong, 
resilient path dependent tendencies often make it difficult to meet the challenge of reform. 
The article puts three specific areas under the analytical microscope; the state’s attitude to 
regulating German business, meeting international anti-corruption commitments and 
doing justice to the rising transparency agenda. It illustrates that high profile examples of 
German-based multinational businesses being caught – by both American and German 
prosecutors – engaging in corruption prompted these companies to make significant 
changes to their compliance regimes. This critical juncture prompted reform, in larger 
German companies at least, in a way that hasn’t happened across much of the Mittelstand. 
Germany’s preparedness to do justice to its international commitments, meanwhile, has 
been strongly dependent on whether those commitments fitted the internal logic of 
German politics and indeed German law. Where they did, change has been efficient and 
effective. Where they didn’t, and in the absence of any critical junctures, change has only 
infrequently been forthcoming. Finally, the rise of an international transparency agenda 
has not fitted with the path dependent logics of German public life, and change in this area 
has subsequently been minimal. The article concludes by arguing that whilst Germany has 
a generally strong anti-corruption record, German elites would nonetheless benefit from 
being a little more proactive in thinking about where corruption may be lurking and what 
they might want to do about it.  
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Germany has traditionally been viewed as a country where corruption is under control. It 
has never been viewed as non-existent, but for much of  the post-war period it was still 
seen as something that happened largely elsewhere. Where it did occur, it was viewed as a 
case of  isolated individuals enriching themselves but where systems of  oversight, 
compliance and cultures of  ‘doing the right thing’ would ultimately prevail. Indeed, these 
attitudes were traditionally not just evident in Germany, they were the norm across much 
of  the western world. 
 
Only in the 1980s was the popular perception that Germany didn’t have a corruption 
problem questioned. Since then attitudes have changed considerably and corruption is now 
recognised as a major-policy challenge. This article subsequently looks at what Germany’s 
corruption problems are and what it has done to try and tackle them. It argues that in 
many ways Germany’s institutional framework remains well set to meet corruption 
challenges when they arise. But, as and when reform of  that framework happens it is 
largely of  a path-dependent nature. That does not necessarily need to be a problem. 
However, it has ensured that there has often been a resistance to what in effect would be 
path-changing reform. Sometimes this resistance is strong enough to resist reform 
completely, sometimes it ensures that when reforms do happen that is as they take on a 
logic that fits the German context. Only rarely do ‘path-changing’ reforms take place. This 
could plausibly be storing up a range of  problems for the future.  
 
The article begins by outlining how corruption in Germany has traditionally been analysed. 
As inferred above, much of  this analysis centred round praising how rigorous Germany’s 
institutional framework was. The article then moves on to explaining how the academic 
analysis of  corruption, once itself  a largely peripheral occupation, experienced something 
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of  a revival in the 1980s and 1990s. It did so largely as political economists developed a 
powerful set of  causal explanations that purported not only to explain corruption’s 
existence but also to offer intellectually consistent solutions for counteracting it. Whilst 
this approach remains pervasive, the article goes on to explain that a neo-institutionalist 
focus has risen to challenge it. This focus stresses that institutions (in a broad sense) shape 
not only the type of  corruption that exists but also perceptions of  what is (and isn’t) 
appropriate behaviour. This applies both to understandings of  what corruption is as well 
as to what appropriate responses to it might be. When corruption is understood in these 
contingent terms we can understand more about when change happens and why it happens 
in some areas but not in others. The article then outlines three specific corruption 
challenges that Germany faces and explains why reform has come at different times, in 
different ways and to different effect in these areas. Given that, the conclusion is a sobering 
one. While the Federal Republic generally performs admirably in international corruption 
comparisons, the conservatism that still shapes German anti-corruption thinking leaves 
the country poorly placed to react to corruption challenges. Many German politicians have 
failed to show enough urgency in addressing corruption issues and Germany would benefit 
from its leaders thinking just a little more about where corruption may be lurking and what 
it might want to do about it rather than assuming that its institutional framework is apt to 
deal with whatever corruption challenges may lurch suddenly in to the public sphere.  
 
The challenge of  dealing with corruption in Germany  
Until relatively recently corruption in the domestic context was not seen as much of  a 
problem at all in Germany.1   This prompted one of  Germany’s most-well respected 
analysts of  corruption, Ulrich von Alemann, to note that the “notion of  corruption” was 
an “almost unknown term” in domestic political analysis. 2   Such thinking prompted 
Theodor Eschenburg to claim in 1970 that the German people had been “spoiled by an 
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extremely honest public administration”, and were subsequently very sensitive to 
administrative malpractice. 3   The lack of  perceived corruption was, according to 
Eschenburg, important in helping Germans remain particularly sensitive to situations 
where ‘black sheep’ might appear to abuse the country’s system of  good governance. A 
decade and a half  later, and this approach appeared to be very much intact, as was 
exemplified by another leading German political scientist, Paul Noack, when he claimed 
that Germans continued to believe that “theirs is one of  those nations that has proved to 
be most resistant to corruption”.4   
 
These impressions no longer hold much water. Yet, awareness of  corruption took a long 
time to filter into legal and procedural changes, and until 1999 it was, for example, perfectly 
legal for companies in Germany to bribe foreign officials to gain contracts. Furthermore, 
these bribes were even tax deductible. By the turn of  the 21st Century German attitudes 
were on the way to moving full circle (see below), as Germans became highly critical of  
their public servants. However, Transparency International’s (TI) most recent (2012) 
National Integrity System Report notes that Germany does still come “at the top end of  
the NIS assessment system” and scores very well across “all analysed areas and 
government levels”.5  Indeed, TI further adds that Germany has a “very good integrity 
system” that is well equipped “for preventing and repressing corruption”. 6   Recent 
governments have therefore been acting within the confines of  a democratic, legal, 
institutional and economic system that is generally seen to work well and to be well suited 
to dealing with corruption challenges.  
 
It is perhaps worth remembering this when looking at the specific activities of  German 
governments, mainly as the bulk of  the most recent anti-corruption activity came well over 
a decade ago, in the mid-late 1990s.7  The measures that are currently in place remain highly 
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diverse, although they centre around the ‘Concept of  Corruption Prevention’ developed 
by the Standing Conference of  Federal State Ministers and Senators of  the Interior (IMK) 
held in May 1995.8  A number of  specific anti-corruption initiatives have been put forward 
since then, the most prominent of  which was the 1998 Anti-Corruption Act. The 1998 
Act remains the last to be implemented without clearly discernible external influence, 
indicating the reactive nature of  policy-making in this area. Other pieces of  legislation have 
certainly followed (in 1999, for example, the Act Against International Corruption and the 
EU Anti-Corruption Acts were both passed, whilst further amendments were made to 
bribery laws in 2002 and 2015), but they have all, for better or worse, “originated in 
international legal instruments”.9  Be that as it may, these new laws “greatly expanded 
Germany’s anticorruption focus” and signalled a step change in how corruption was 
viewed.10  The German criminal code subsequently now lays down detailed provisions in 
sections 331-338 concerning bribery in public office, sections 299-302 (focusing on bribery 
in the business sector) and sections 108b-198e (bribery in and around the democratic 
process).11   
 
Gerhard Schröder’s centre-left government (1998-2005), Angela Merkel’s ‘Grand 
Coalition’ (2005-2009) and her governments since have nonetheless tended to drag their 
respective feet in terms of  prioritising anti-corruption initiatives. The Ministry of  Justice 
did draft a second Anti-Corruption Act (Zweites Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Korruption) in 
2006, with the stated intention of  factoring new international agreements in to Germany’s 
criminal code. Ultimately, the draft got nowhere near the statute book, mainly as there was, 
and is, no consensus that Germany’s first anti-corruption law actually needs radically 
changing. A significant number of  German policy-makers remain, as Nick Lord has 
persuasively argued, confident that “national provisions on corruption-related criminal 
offences” are already located in existing legal statutes and there is therefore little reason to 
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set out on wholesale changes.12 
 
What, where and how much corruption is there in Germany? 
What, therefore, is the nature of  Germany’s corruption challenge?  Given the clandestine 
nature of  corruption this question remains inherently difficult to answer. Indeed, it is 
impossible to know exactly how much corruption exists and all the forms that it is taking. 
In terms of  the scale of  the problem, a number of  organisations have nonetheless 
developed tools to compare and contrast levels of  perceived corruption across national 
boundaries. The most well-known (although not uncontroversial) of  these comes via 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions’ Index (CPI). 13   The CPI is a 
composite index and a variety of  data sources are used to create what is in effect a poll of  
polls on perceptions of  corruption in a given country. Data is gathered from surveys of  
business people and country experts with the aim of  measuring “perceptions … of  
corruption in the public sector including corruption involving public officials, civil 
servants or politicians”.14  TI provides a detailed account of  where its data comes from 
and also how it uses it, and this is accessible via TI’s own website.  
 
Over the last 20 years Germany’s performance in the CPI has been passable. But it has not 
been outstanding. In 2001, for example, Germany was a mere 20th out of  91 countries 
(with a score of  7.4 out of  10). By 2010 Germany’s score had improved to 7.9 (14th out of  
180) and by 2014 Germany registered 79 (now out of  100), leaving it joint 12th out of  175. 
There have been improvements since the nadir of  the post-Kohl-donations scandal era, 
but Germany has never been top of  the class (the Scandinavian countries and New 
Zealand traditionally compete for that title).  
 
If  we look at data from another of  the most prominent attempts to measure corruption 
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worldwide we see a similar picture. The World Governance Indicators (WGI) are the most 
ambitious attempts to measure the quality of  governance generally.15 First published in 
1996, they are composite indices that seek to measure perceived levels of  governance 
quality across six specific dimensions, one of  which is ‘control of  corruption’. The WGI 
now use data on 212 countries and territories, based on 35 data sources from 33 different 
organisations. The data reflects the perceptions of  a wide array of  ‘informed stakeholders’, 
whether they are country experts, households, representatives from NGOs or members 
of  the business community. Dan Kaufmann and his colleagues are quick to recognise the 
limitations of  the WGI as perception-based indicators, but they have nonetheless 
developed in to some of  the most widely respected data on governance that’s available.16  
The high point for Germany in terms of  that particular indicator came back in 1998 (2.16; 
2.5 would be the highest score), but Germany hasn’t managed to record a score of  2.0 or 
above since then. Over time Germany’s control of  corruption scores have been good, but 
there is also clearly still room for improvement.  
 
If  we move from attempts to measure how much corruption exists to what types of  
corruption problem there are then we find a similar picture. The 2013 Global Corruption 
Barometer (GCB), a global survey of  individuals, revealed that a mere 8 per cent of  
Germans thought that the level of  corruption in Germany had decreased over the last two 
years. 57 per cent thought that it had increased.17  Only 13 per cent of  Germans thought 
corruption was either ‘not really a problem’ or ‘not a problem at all’, whilst 28 per cent 
believed that ‘it is a problem’ and a worrying 37 per cent a ‘serious problem’. Furthermore, 
65 per cent of  Germans thought political parties were in general corrupt, 54 per cent 
thought the same of  the media whilst 49 per cent thought civil servants were either 
‘corrupt’ or ‘extremely corrupt’. Managers of  German firms have a similarly downbeat 
view on the role that corruption plays in public life in Germany with a 2014 survey from 
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Ernst and Young revealing that 26 per cent feel that corruption is pervasive. If  that figure 
isn’t worrying enough, it is actually an improvement on the 2012 figure of  30 per cent.18 
 
It is therefore impossible to know exactly how much corruption there is in Germany (or 
indeed anywhere else). But it is also clear that Germany doesn’t perform quite as well as 
many of  its neighbours in international indices and Germans themselves clearly perceive 
there to be a corruption problem evident in their state. The specific nature of  the 
‘corruption problem’ is often left vague and undefined, but Germans nonetheless appear 
to think something is wrong. Before analysing whether Germans’ pessimism is warranted, 
it is important to take a step back and understand a little more about how corruption is 
conceptualised in a broader sense.  
 
Understanding corruption  
Approaches to understanding corruption have evolved considerably over time. 
Traditionally corruption was understood as something that happened when organisations 
or individuals moved away from a ‘pure’ state of  being. In a political sense the emphasis 
in early works on corruption tended to be on its role in causing state failure or moral decay. 
One of the key reasons for the fall of the Roman Empire, for example, was the apparent 
corruption that became endemic in the way that the state was governed; moral decay led 
ultimately to the end of the Empire itself.19  Less emphasis was subsequently placed on 
individuals abusing their own pre-defined roles for private gain, and more on the impact 
of  their behaviour on the systems of  which they were a part. 
 
By the end of  the 20th Century a different consensus had emerged. An array of  
international organisations not only discovered corruption as a policy challenge, but began 
to understand the nature of  that challenge in strikingly similar ways; Transparency 
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International, the leading NGO in the field, talked of  corruption as “the abuse of  
entrusted power for private gain”, whilst the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) believed corruption to be “the active or passive misuse of  the 
powers of  public officials (appointed or elected) for private financial or other benefits”.20  
Christian Schiller from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) believed corruption to be 
“the abuse of  public power for private benefit” whilst the World Bank began using almost 
identical language (“the abuse of  public office for private gain”).21  
 
These understandings were not conjured out of  thin air. On the contrary, the World Bank 
and IMF in particular have traditionally been keen to base their anti-corruption agendas 
on the evidence produced by political economists. It should not therefore be too much of  
a surprise that much of  the international anti-corruption discourse fits nicely with the 
language of  those working in that tradition. Mushtaq Khan, for example, sees corruption 
as “behaviour that deviates from the formal rules of  conduct governing the actions of  
someone in a position of  public authority because of  private-regarding motives” whilst 
Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny argue that corruption is “the sale by government 
officials of  government property for personal gain”. 22  Susan Rose-Ackerman, in her 
seminal contribution from 1999, talks of  the use of  public office for “private economic 
gain”, whilst Robert Klitgaard sees corruption simply as “the misuse of  office for 
unofficial ends”.23   
 
Political economists embraced the notion of  corruption being about individuals 
consciously taking decisions that were in one way or another an abuse of  their public roles. 
Their aim in doing this was nothing short of  creating an intellectually coherent theory of  
corruption. This theory-building became part of  an “economic turn” in political analysis 
more broadly, and was premised on a decidedly negative understanding of  human nature.24 
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Humans were assumed to be rational actors looking to maximise their utility.25 Actors in 
positions of  power would subsequently evaluate the benefits that they were likely to accrue 
through abusing their public role for private gain and compare these potential benefits 
with the potential costs; namely, what are the chances of  being caught and what are the 
potential scope and extent of  sanctions if  that happens. For these analysts corruption 
analysis subsequently offered an opportunity not just to illustrate that the state was wasteful 
but also that the rent-seeking tendencies of  politicians could, and indeed would, lead to an 
escalation in the number of  corrupt practices.26  The notion that state could provide 
efficient and effective (and by definition corruption-free) services was dismissed by the 
more strident as nothing more than idealistic “romanticism”.27  It became clear that for 
many, corruption was seen as the product of  incentive structures that the state provided. 
Getting the institutional setting right was, for these thinkers, subsequently the key to 
tackling corruption. 
 
Influential though this paradigm still was, and indeed still is, it has not been without 
criticism. Indeed, a group of  what Hellmann (2016) calls neo-institutionalists have 
developed a powerful critique of  this approach. 28   The focus of  much of  the neo-
institutionalists’ analysis is the non-western world, and the (often radically) different 
context within which politics can often take place there. The key assumptions that the neo-
institutionalists make, however, undoubtedly have wider implications; in a theoretical sense 
they reject the notion that actors’ interests and subsequently actors’ behaviour are 
exogenously fixed. On the contrary, individuals’ behaviour is shaped and influenced by 
their interactions with other individuals and with the institutions within which decisions 
are made, and this applies as much to advanced industrial democracies as it does to, for 
example, economically under-developed dictatorships.29 Context, in other words, matters. 
It matters in shaping not just what corruption is understood to be, but also whether sets 
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of  proposed reforms appear logical and coherent. Context will be crucial in understanding 
whether proposed reforms ultimately see the light of  day. 
 
The neo-institutionalist critique implies that change is difficult to enact, and that where it 
does happen it occurs for specific reasons. Understanding the factors that enable this to 
happen remains one of  the key challenges that corruption scholars everywhere are 
currently grappling with. To be more precise, the neo-institutionalist approach to 
understanding corruption reform argues that institutions shape and structure the actions 
of  individuals without determining them. Given that reforming both formal and informal 
institutional frameworks takes time it should be no surprise that change often only takes 
place very slowly. Michael Koβ subsequently argues that change happens for three reasons. 
Firstly, he talks of  institutional conservatism, or a deliberative acceptance of  change that 
has actually already happened.30  Secondly, change takes the form of  path dependent 
development that accepts and works with the internal logic of  the current institutional 
setting. History, geography and cultural contingency inform contextually determined 
change. Finally, there are what Koβ describes as ‘path-changes’. These aren’t context-
related and they often happen as a reaction to an external shock or changed set of  
exogenous circumstances.  
 
This understanding of  when change happens stresses “the endogenous character of  
preference formation” and emphasises that context is an important determinant in 
facilitating (or not, as the case may be) change.31  The preferences of  actors will be 
continually shaped (although not determined) not by pre-given sets of  interests, but by the 
context within action takes place. Change is often likely to be evolutionary in style and 
piecemeal in nature. Given this, we should expect to see context-friendly, evolutionary 
changes in Germany’s anti-corruption setting much more than path-breaking departures. 
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The latter should only happen when exogenous shocks cause actors to respond directly to 
given challenges. Given that Germany has a generally well-functioning anti-corruption 
framework that won’t happen frequently. The following section outlines applies this neo-
institutionalist approach in more detail to the German case.  
 
The German challenge 
Anti-corruption reforms differ (often considerably) from country to country and will be 
dependent on the type of  corruption challenge to hand and the quality of  governance that 
a state already exhibits. 32  Germany’s challenges fit in to three distinct dimensions of  
corruption. There are linkages across dimensions and they do rise and fall in domestic 
salience, but taken together they have represented the broad base of  issues that have 
needed to be confronted. The first dimension centres round the relationship between 
German business and the state. Secondly, Germany remains reluctant to do justice to many 
of  the international commitments that it has signed up to, particularly if  that involves 
updating its legal framework. Finally, there is a gap between Germany’s rhetoric on the 
merits of  transparency and openness and its willingness to do justice to this rhetoric in 
practice.  
 
German business and the challenge of  dealing with corruption 
The first of  these dimensions concerns corruption in and around the German business 
community. Whilst the behaviour of  private entities is something that they and they alone 
have to answer for, it is also true that German policy-makers have a responsibility to ensure 
that companies that are nominally active in their jurisdiction are encouraged to behave 
appropriately. In other words if  the German government believes that corruption has 
negative effects not just on economic growth but also on an array of  other social and 
political phenomena, then it is morally obliged to try and stamp it out. The focus here is 
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not just on the leading lights of  German business, but also on the much-vaunted 
Mittelstand. Indeed, given the strong export performance of  many sectors of  the German 
economy, vigilance of  the corruption risks that small and medium-sized as well as large 
enterprises face when conducting affairs abroad is also necessary.  
 
Even the most cursory look at the behaviour of  some of  the biggest names in German 
business over the last decade will reveal that there were corruption challenges to be faced. 
The cases of  Siemens, Daimler and BASF (to name but three) illustrate that the there are 
occasions when companies act in a fashion that can certainly be termed corrupt. The fact 
that Siemens used a wide-ranging system of  bribes to help it achieve its business goals is 
well known, leading to a $1.6bn legal settlement in the USA in 2008 and total costs to the 
company of  €2.5bn.33  Daimler, meanwhile, paid $185 million to settle charges that it used 
bribery as a fundamental part of  its business model when trying to win government 
contracts in no less than 22 countries between 1998 and 2008. BASF was caught fixing the 
prices of  vitamins and subsequently paid fines in both North America and Europe totalling 
over half  a billion dollars.34  These are not just drops in the ocean; this is the type of  
behaviour that is planned, orchestrated and in some cases part of  and parcel of  particular 
business models. 
 
There has in recent times been a move to prosecute more of  those caught behaving in a 
corrupt fashion. This has been the case both within Germany and abroad, and has 
prompted many German multi-nationals to re-think their attitudes to corruption. Both 
Volkswagen and Siemens saw high-ranking officials sent to prison for their roles in the 
corrupt practices that their companies had indulged in, whilst the fines dished out to those 
who’ve been caught have clearly been substantial. Prosecutions for corruption in the 
German business world have, in the words of  the New York Times, “soared” and in 2011 
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the OECD praised Germany for the fact that 70 individuals and six companies had been 
successfully prosecuted over the previous six years. Germany prosecutors’ increasingly 
proactive behaviour, often in tandem with authorities in the USA, has subsequently led to 
something of  a change of  tone and in 2012 Markus Funk and Jess Dance bluntly advised 
“companies doing business in Germany or with German companies” to make themselves 
very “familiar with Germany’s anticorruption laws”.35  German authorities recognised the 
challenge and have attempted to rise to it. 
 
Large companies have subsequently given some serious thought to how compliance 
programmes should be set up. Both BASF and Siemens have been praised for the way they 
developed their compliance programmes following their corruption scandals, and both are 
quick to illustrate how seriously they now take these issues. These developments have still 
not stopped some German companies from transgressing. If  compliance programmes 
were working perfectly across the board then Rheinmetall wouldn’t have been fined 
Euro37 million for indulging in bribery whilst selling its anti-aircraft defence system and 
in 2015 Volkswagen wouldn’t have been uncovered massaging the emissions figures for 
the diesel cars that it sold in the USA.36   
 
The area of  compliance is nonetheless an area where German companies have carried 
through what Koβ would describe as a path-change. This path-change stems not only from 
the increased willingness of  German prosecutors to go after potentially corrupt firms, but 
also as US authorities have used Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) to levy heavy fines 
on miscreants. The FCPA has existed since 1997, but only a relatively small number of  
prosecutions made under it until the late 1990s.  This, however, changed in the 1990s and 
2000s, and any company that does business that touches American soil (defined, for 
example, as simply using a US bank) realised that it might come in the line of  fire. 
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Exogenous factors subsequently prompted a number of  large German companies to 
radically change the way that they did things. Indeed, this has been acknowledged by the 
European Commission, and it argued in 2014 that in Germany “compliance systems in the 
private sector have become more elaborate in recent years, especially in global companies 
dealing with international business transactions”.37 The Commission noted further that 
this had “happened as a result of  high-profile cases which triggered a significant change 
in attitudes towards corruption in particular among German multinational corporations”.38  
The rise in the importance of  compliance can, in other words, be led back to the high-
profile compliance failings of  some of  the leading lights of  German industry – a classic 
path-change scenario. 
  
Despite more proactive US behaviour and a willingness on the German part to work with 
their American colleagues, the traditional criminal law focus on individual wrongdoing in 
a given territorial jurisdiction nonetheless becomes ever more challenging to do justice to.39  
The nature of  this changing environment has seen more enforcement cooperation across 
jurisdictions and requires significant harmonisation of  domestic legal systems and 
approaches.40  It is for this very reason that the OECD’s much vaunted anti-bribery treaty 
exists. It is subsequently a logical extension of  Germany’s strongly legalistic culture to try 
and expand the scope and impact of  criminal law to try and catch miscreants in the act. 
Attempts to generate more prosecutions at home subsequently represent path dependent 
evolution in Germany’s anti-corruption practice. 
 
However, the importance of  exports to the German economy means that policy-makers 
need to be vigilant in making sure that the complexity of  corruption transactions doesn’t 
leave its law enforcement officers behind. Germany has not followed the American and 
particularly British lead in criminalising the failure to prevent bribery offences. Both the 
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American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the UK’s Bribery Act (UKBA) have 
sent strong, clear statements to those doing business from, in and with the USA and the 
UK that bribery will not be tolerated. The UKBA is particularly clear on the illegality of  
facilitation payments and also on the responsibilities that companies have to educate their 
workforces and those who are working for them as contractors. A German version of  such 
an Act would be a good way to emphasise how seriously Germany takes these concerns 
and to how globalisation cannot be used as an (often indirect) excuse for indulging in 
corrupt activity and of  building on the strong foundations that already exist.  
 
Such an Act would, however, be path-changing rather than path-dependent. Over decades 
German exporters have been actively encouraged to invest in developing markets, with 
€71bn of  German products going to China alone in 2015.41 The high cost, high quality 
exports that Mittelstand companies have produced have subsequently been the very 
backbone of  the German economy. Yet these markets are frequently based in 
environments where corruption is more problematic than it is in Germany. The German 
business community is likely to be wary of  new legislation that looks like it could place 
onerous administrative and bureaucratic burdens on their business activities. The strong 
voice of  German business is therefore likely to lobby hard to prevent such legislation from 
being enacted. Smaller, Mittelstand companies did also not experience the compliance shock 
that larger companies did, and many of  them have either poorly developed compliance 
programmes or indeed no programmes at all. As the European Commission (2014) noted 
“when it comes to small and medium sized enterprises, corporate governance programmes 
and compliance structures are not yet widespread”.42   
 
Meeting international commitments 
Change in the area of  aligning German law and practices to the international commitments 
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that the country has signed up to has been much less path-changing and much more path 
dependent. Indeed, at times German elites have actively campaigned against path-breaking 
change when it went against the conventional ethos of  public life in Germany. Indeed, on 
occasion it was only after at times years of  prevarication that German policy-makers agreed 
to update their national frameworks to do justice to international anti-corruption 
commitments.  
 
Since the 1990s Germany has needed to adapt its domestic legal framework to meet 
international obligations in a number of  areas. Whilst Germany generally does ratify and 
then implement the international treaties that it signs, its relationship with some of  the key 
parts of  the international anti-corruption architecture has at times been an uncomfortable 
one. On the one hand Germany has received glowing recommendations from 
organisations such as TI for its attempts to actively enforce the OECD’s anti-bribery treaty. 
Given that only four (Switzerland, the UK and the USA were the others) out of  the 41 
signatories were put in to this category, this can be seen as evidence that Germany can and 
will meet its commitments when it wants to.43  Germany has also transposed the European 
Union’s Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA on corruption in the private sector in to 
domestic law. This is further evidence that where obligations reflect pre-existing German 
norms, German politicians have been able to act quickly and decisively to ensure that their 
domestic rules and practices have adapted accordingly. 
 
On the other hand Germany has also shown a tendency to implement just the minimum 
requirements when meeting other international obligations.44 On occasion it has also taken 
a (very) long time to even meet some of  the most basic obligations; Germany, for example, 
only ratified the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in November 2014 
(making it the 173rd state to do so) and this despite long-standing, significant pressure from 
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German business and civil society to put its house in order.45  This unseemly delay in 
signing the UNCAC was due more to procedural than substantive factors centring largely 
around (predominantly conservative) parliamentarians’ unwillingness to change legislation 
on bribing MdBs (members of  Parliament) but that it took over a decade to sort out was 
a classic result of  external agreements fitting uneasily with national ways of  thinking.  
 
Germany has also failed to adopt a number of  the specific anti-corruption measures 
recommended to it by the Council of  Europe and OECD and it could have easily 
embraced the monitoring processes within the UNCAC before ratifying it.46 Furthermore, 
the Council of  Europe’s Group of  States against Corruption (GRECO) noted in 2012 that 
Germany had paid “limited attention” to recommendations it made in the area of  party 
funding. GRECO argued that there was a need “to ensure timely publication of  campaign 
accounts, to make direct donations to parliamentarians and candidates who are political 
party members more transparent, and to make further resources available to the Bundestag 
administration for supervising party funding”. The German authorities have chosen simply 
to ignore this. This prompted GRECO to conclude that “the level of  compliance with the 
recommendations … remained ‘globally unsatisfactory’”.47 In 2011 GRECO also criticised 
the exemptions that parliamentarians enjoy from criminal liability for certain acts related 
to corruption.48  
 
Making national law align with international law is not always straightforward. The 
ramifications of  one change can have knock on effects on other parts of  the legal 
infrastructure. It is not surprising that Parliamentarians have often shied away from 
embracing anything but the most contextually straightforward proposals for change. Path 
dependent change, in other words, was often not an immediate option. Too much change 
was required to Germany’s legal provisions to have made that a viable route forward. 
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Germany also hasn’t had anything akin to a critical juncture that could prompt path-
changes; unlike with large multi-nationals and the urgent need to adopt more effective 
compliance regimes, parliamentarians had little compelling them to come up with new 
ways forward in terms of  aligning Germany’s domestic framework with international best 
practice.  
 
The challenge of  transparency 
In recent times there have been a series of  international moves to embrace notions of  
transparency in public affairs. These initiatives have come in wide and varied form, and 
range from moves to bring more transparency to the extractive industries (EITI) to open 
data initiatives and movements to allow citizens greater access to information held by the 
state on them (FoI). Governments and international organisations are increasingly moved 
to embrace this burgeoning transparency agenda. 
 
Whilst Germany has supported these initiatives in public, at times they do still represent a 
movement away from previous ways of  doing things. This clash between new ideas and 
institutional conservatism has ensured that Germany has at times been slow in moving to 
embrace the move towards greater transparency in public affairs. Indeed, this is in many 
ways where Germany faces the most diverse set of  challenges and also where there appears 
to be the most unwillingness to move forward. Path dependency remains a powerful force 
mitigating against implementing much of  this agenda.  
 
In 2014, for example, as a member of  the G20 Germany made a series of  commitments 
to try and tackle money laundering. All G20 members agreed to adopt legislation on what 
were termed “high priority” issues on the beneficial ownership of  companies.49  Beneficial 
ownership legislation allows the wider world to see not just who officially runs a company, 
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but also who takes home the profits. One of  the tricks of  the money launderer is to make 
a company look legitimate, whilst covertly taking home (or re-introducing and/or re-
cycling) the profits surreptitiously. Although the EU has been active in trying to expand 
the scope of  beneficial ownership legislation, Germany has tried to limit public access to 
information on who exactly takes home these profits. Germany has subsequently tended 
to be one of  the first countries to stress the problems inherent in the EU’s transparency 
disclosure rule that would compel all member states to make publicly accessible the real 
owners of  companies and trusts.50   
 
That becomes even more obvious if  one looks at how Germany has tried to do justice to 
the promises it made in this area. By the middle of  November 2015 Germany only had a 
framework of  “average” quality to deal with questions of  beneficial ownership, lagging 
behind the UK, France, Italy and also Argentina. Furthermore Germany was only fully 
compliant with one of  the ten principles that it had signed up to.51  There is, for example, 
no requirement in Germany that systematic information is maintained on beneficial 
ownership (principle 3) and there is no centralised database that competent authorities can 
consult (principle 8).52  Germany is by no means the worst offender in the G20, but that 
shouldn’t deflect from the fact there is subsequently still work to be done. That these ideas 
would represent a change in how German authorities dealt with data has ensured that 
resistance to change has remained considerable. 
 
Transparency problems also need to be addressed elsewhere. This is particularly true at the 
sub-national level where many incidences of  corruption take place. Whilst a federal 
freedom of  information law has existed since 2005, as of  2015 four Laender had resisted 
passing such an Act in their jurisdictions. Only three of  the sixteen federal states 
(Thuringia, Lower Saxony and Rhineland-Palatinate) have committed themselves to follow 
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Hamburg’s lead in enacting transparency laws, whilst the 2015 case of  Bayer AG and the 
University of  Cologne is a good indication that transparency as a culture is a long way from 
being genuinely embraced.53  In this particular instance Bayer AG and the University of  
Cologne agreed in 2008 to work together on a pharmaceuticals project. A number of  
external observers were worried that the agreement may contravene the norms of  
academic freedom and asked to see the details of  the deal. This was rejected by the 
signatories, as well as ultimately by the judicial authorities. A transparency law would not 
only ensure that many cases of  this nature wouldn’t have to end up in courts, but would 
help the public keep abreast of  who was agreeing to do what for whom. 
 
In terms of  the broader relationships between the private sector and those in positions of  
political power, Germany’s lobbying practices – and the lack of  transparency that 
underpins them – have also come in for criticism. Lobbying is a clearly a fundamental part 
of  democratic politics, but in order to prevent the rich and powerful skewing the system 
to suit their own interests regulation of  lobbying practices is generally regarded as being 
important. Getting lobbying rules right is tricky, as the UK case has revealed 54 , but 
Germany’s inaction in this area nonetheless remains noteworthy. Indeed, in a formal sense 
lobbying is not regulated at all in Germany and public officials are under no obligation to 
report meetings with lobbyists. A voluntary register exists within parliament where 
associations themselves may choose to register, but, firstly, this remains voluntary and, 
secondly, the term association is narrowly understood. As the European Commission has 
bemoaned “self-employed lobbyists, lawyers, think tanks or NGOs” need not tell anyone 
anything about the lobbying that they may do.55  Furthermore, German policy-makers are 
not obliged to be open about who they meet to discuss policy with and very few have taken 
the initiative in revealing this information unilaterally.56  Germany’s attempts at doing 
justice to the problem of  undue influence occurring through the lobbying process have 
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subsequently been met with some scepticism, one report placing it in the bottom third of  
countries within the EU in terms of  how strong its safeguards are on preventing undue 
influence.57   
 
A further example of  German recalcitrance concerns data on anti-corruption law 
enforcement across the 16 Länder. As things stand, it is very difficult indeed to find 
comparable data on which people and which companies have been subject to legal 
proceedings. Making such information publically available in an accessible format could 
lead to a publically available list of  companies that have fallen foul of  corruption 
legislation. This could then lead to barring them from bidding for future contracts. If  
transparency in these areas is seen as the best disinfectant, then Germany still doesn’t 
appear particularly interested in thoroughly cleansing itself. There hasn’t, furthermore, 
been an external shock that might have acted as a catalyst for change; without that, 
Germany is likely to remain a few steps behind the leaders in this particular field. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has illustrated that in many ways Germany’s institutional framework remains 
well set to meet corruption challenges as and when they arise. The institutional framework 
remains strong, the legal framework robust and the willingness to prevent corruption from 
becoming embedded genuine.  
 
Germany has, however, not always been at the forefront of embracing new and potentially 
challenging anti-corruption reform agendas. This article has analysed three particular areas 
where reform has been called for but where resistance to change has been significant. 
Indeed, the neo-institutionalist approach adopted here illustrates that path-changing 
reform happens only infrequently and path dependent reforms that talk to the logic of 
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German political life are much easier to enact. The problem for German policy-makers is 
that contemporary anti-corruption challenges do not fit easily with this logic. This has 
prompted German policy-makers to be slower to enact reform and to meet their 
commitments than they might otherwise have been. Sometimes resistance has been strong 
enough to stop any reform from happening, sometimes it has ensured that reform has 
been piecemeal and patchy. Only rarely, such as the increasing threat that (in particular) 
large companies face of prosecution in both Germany and particularly the USA do ‘path-
changing’ reforms take place.  
 
Academic analysis of corruption has come a long way in the last decade. The dominance 
previously exerted by political economists utilising rational choice models of human 
behaviour has been challenged by neo-institutionalists arguing that institutions shape not 
only the type of corruption that exists but also perceptions of what is (and isn’t) 
appropriate behaviour. The neo-institutionalist paradigm is also useful in illustrating that 
responses to perceived corruption problems are contingent on the institutional context. 
This approach helps us understand when change is likely to happen and why it happens in 
some areas but not in others.  
 
The conservatism that instinctively shapes much German anti-corruption thinking leaves 
the country poorly placed to react to corruption challenges. Many German politicians have 
failed to show enough urgency in addressing corruption issues and Germany would benefit 
from its leaders thinking just a little more about where corruption may be lurking and what 
it might want to do about it rather than assuming that its institutional framework is apt to 
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